The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East

In Short

This second volume of General Alekseĭ Nikolaevich Kuropatkin’s memoirs presents a critical internal autopsy of the Imperial Russian Army’s defeat in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War. Writing as the former Commander-in-Chief, Kuropatkin analyzes tactical errors, organizational breakdowns, and political interference, contrasting high expectations with grim battlefield realities at Liao-yang, Hei-kou-tai, and Mukden. It endures as a rare, authoritative, and unsparing look into the operational collapse of a major world power from the top commander’s perspective.

The Story

The volume opens with a minute, technical assessment of Russia’s tactical failures on the battlefields of Manchuria. Kuropatkin methodically demonstrates how close-formation retreats created easy targets for Japanese artillery, while the absence of night operations, poor communications between senior leaders, and a lack of proper reconnaissance crippled offensive actions. Compounding these tactical mistakes is a severe structural drain on combat strength. Regiments are stripped of front-line rifles to fill non-combat roles, such as improvised transport units, road crews, and stretcher-bearers, because native transport and Russian hired labor repeatedly fail under fire.

From tactical deficiencies, the argument expands into a broader indictment of the army’s organizational and moral breakdown. Senior commanders lack initiative, relying entirely on orders from above, while junior officers suffer from public discrediting in newspapers and literature. Reservists arrive poorly trained and uneducated compared to their Japanese counterparts, whose private soldiers carry detailed maps and field diaries. When heavy fighting begins, units panic, disperse into tall crops, or retreat prematurely, turning tactical setbacks into widespread retreats.

The narrative reaches its focal point as Kuropatkin recounts the major operational movements and key engagements. At Liao-yang, premature retreats by exposed columns disrupt offensive plans and expose the entire left flank. At Hei-kou-tai, coordination crumbles when troops are sent on misdirected marches or ordered across vast fronts without adequate preparation. The operational climax unfolds at the Battle of Mukden, where confused orders, fragmented unit distributions, and premature retreats by division commanders cause corps to mix together in utter chaos. Japanese forces break through the lines, force a retreat through narrow defiles under heavy crossfire, and capture or destroy key rear guards.

Following the military breakdown, the text turns to political corruption. An appendix detailing the Royal Timber Company exposes how speculative ventures along the Ya-lu River—backed by Grand Dukes and the Tsar himself—diverted military resources and altered imperial foreign policy for private financial gain. Kuropatkin concludes by presenting comprehensive proposals for army reorganization, advocating for larger combat companies, independent reserve brigades, and better peacetime officer education, while lamenting that peace was signed at Portsmouth just as material supplies finally reached peak strength.

How It Unfolds

Analyzing tactical shortcomings Kuropatkin breaks down the primary tactical errors observed in early engagements, pointing to poor formation choices during retreats, excessive wasting of artillery ammunition, and a lack of proper communication between senior officers.

Exposing logistics and manpower drain The author details how non-combat duties, transport demands, and reliable labor shortages strip up to a quarter of all rifles from front-line infantry regiments before battle ever commences.

Examining organizational rot The narrative examines the lack of initiative among junior and senior commanders, contrasting the low literacy of Russian reservists with the highly educated, self-reliant Japanese troops.

Detailing operational collapses Through detailed accounts of Liao-yang and Hei-kou-tai, the text outlines how misdirected orders, unexpected panics in tall crops, and uncoordinated attacks lead to sudden retreats.

Recounting the defeat at Mukden Kuropatkin traces the catastrophic breakdown during the Battle of Mukden, where corps lines fracture, unit distribution collapses, and Japanese forces press retreating Russian troops into fatal choke points.

Exposing court corruption An included documentation of the Ya-lu River timber enterprise reveals how court speculators and royal investments warped Russian military posture and provoked conflict in Korea.

Proposing structural reforms The volume closes with concrete reform plans for regiments, divisions, and reserve systems, offering a final reflection on the duty performed by the army despite ultimate defeat.

The People

• General Alekseĭ Nikolaevich Kuropatkin: The author and Commander-in-Chief of the Manchurian Army, who seeks to explain Russia's defeat while defending his record. He constantly struggles against logistical shortfalls, uncoordinated subordinates, and court interference, ending the war relieved of supreme command yet still convinced of his strategy.
• Alexander Mikhailovich Bezobrazoff: A fluent, persuasive promoter and speculator who secures the Korean timber concession. He wins the financial backing of the Tsar and Grand Dukes, using his court influence to alter Far Eastern policy and push Russia toward conflict.
• General Grippenberg: A senior commander whose mismanaged instructions and broad offensive maneuvers at Hei-kou-tai exacerbate tactical confusion on the battlefield.
• General Linievitch: A senior general who commands the 1st Manchurian Army and later replaces Kuropatkin as Commander-in-Chief, frequently retaining corps reserves when coordinated movements require them elsewhere.
• Tsar Nicholas II: The Russian Emperor, who invests heavily in private Far Eastern commercial ventures and appoints Kuropatkin due to a dearth of qualified leaders, ultimately concluding peace when domestic unrest threatens the empire.

In Its Own Voice

"In retreating, the movement to the rear of large masses together afforded the enemy a splendid target, for which we suffered."

Kuropatkin explains how outdated movement formations led to heavy, avoidable losses under Japanese artillery fire.

"The lack of education in the peasant is reflected in the private soldier, and the non-existence of a martial spirit amongst the masses, coupled to the dislike for the war, resulted in the absence of a military spirit in our troops in Manchuria."

The author connects societal shortfalls across the empire to the poor motivation and limited initiative of the rank and file.

"Life seemed to die out of our bivouacs, and all our minds were filled by one sad thought—that the war had ended before the enemy had been beaten."

Kuropatkin captures the reaction of the army upon learning that peace negotiations had concluded at Portsmouth.

What It's Really About

Beneath its detailed military accounts and proposed force structures, the book is a study in systemic failure. It explores how a modern war cannot be waged successfully by an army drawn from an uneducated peasantry and led by an officer corps that discourages individual initiative. Kuropatkin argues that tactical bravery is useless when undermined by poor administrative planning, inadequate reserve systems, and bad logistics. Furthermore, the text serves as a critique of autocratic governance, showing how royal self-interest and court speculation can hijack national military strategy, driving a state into a war it is neither organized nor prepared to fight.

Why Read It Today

This volume appeals to readers of military history, geopolitical strategy, and modern European history. Reading Kuropatkin feels like sitting in an imperial war office alongside a defeated commander who is painstakingly reviewing maps, strength returns, and telegrams to understand how a global empire lost to a rising Asian power. The prose is clear, technical, and earnest, free from self-serving grandiloquence, though it maintains a sober, serious tone throughout.

The book presents several challenges for the casual reader. It is dense with military terminology, detailed force order listings, unit designations, and specific geographic locations across Manchuria. The structural breakdown of infantry regiments and long tabular listings of artillery pieces require patience. Yet, what stays with the reader is the chilling clarity with which Kuropatkin demonstrates how administrative neglect, royal greed, and systemic rigidity can undermine an empire's armed forces long before the first shot is ever fired.