The Unconstitutionality of Slavery

In Short

This book is a foundational legal treatise that systematically dismantles the constitutional basis for slavery in the United States. Rather than relying on contemporary political sentiment, the author employs strict rules of legal construction to argue that the Constitution contains no provisions that recognize or sanction property in man. By scrutinizing colonial charters, state constitutions, and the federal document itself, the work concludes that slavery lacked a valid legal foundation from the start. Its enduring influence lies in its radical application of natural law to the American constitutional system.

The Story

The narrative begins with a fundamental inquiry into the nature of law itself. The author rejects the notion that "law" is merely the arbitrary decree of a supreme power. Instead, he posits that true law must be an intelligible principle of right, derived from human nature, and established through the voluntary association of individuals for mutual protection. This philosophical bedrock sets the stage for a forensic examination of American legal history.

Moving from theory to history, the author addresses the colonial period. He challenges the common assumption that slavery was legally established during this time, arguing that colonial statutes lacked the precision required to define who could be enslaved. He emphasizes that slavery is a condition so odious that it requires clear, positive legislation—which, he contends, never existed in a form consistent with the rights granted in colonial charters or the fundamental principles of natural law.

The core of the argument centers on the Constitution of the United States. The author systematically dissects the clauses frequently cited by proponents of slavery, such as those regarding representation, taxation, and the "importation" of persons. He argues that these provisions—when read according to established legal rules—do not recognize property in man. He insists that terms like "free persons" and "all other persons" must be interpreted in light of the document’s commitment to justice. Furthermore, he contends that the Constitution’s prohibition against states impairing the obligation of contracts, and the guarantee of a republican form of government, are inherently incompatible with the existence of slavery.

The argument reaches its conclusion by addressing the status of children born to enslaved mothers. The author maintains that even if slavery had enjoyed some color of law previously, the Constitution’s silent recognition of natural birth as a source of citizenship effectively rendered all children born since its adoption free. He asserts that no state government possessed the constitutional authority to reduce these individuals to bondage. The book ends by insisting that the legal machinery of the United States was, from its inception, a protector of liberty, and that slavery—lacking any legitimate constitutional warrant—has no valid place in the American legal system.

How It Unfolds

Defining the Legal Foundation The author establishes that legitimate government arises from a voluntary compact intended to protect inherent rights. He argues that any interpretation of law that violates these natural rights is an act of usurpation rather than valid legislation.

Scrutinizing Colonial Precedents The investigation turns to British colonial statutes, where the author demonstrates that these laws failed to define the specific status of enslaved individuals. He explains that without explicit, clear descriptions of who constitutes property, such laws are legally null under the standards of common justice.

Analyzing the Federal Constitution The text moves to the United States Constitution, examining the clauses often misinterpreted as pro-slavery. By applying strict canons of construction, the author argues that these sections are either silent on slavery or reinforce the inherent freedom of all persons.

Asserting the Rights of the Next Generation The final section focuses on the status of those born after the Constitution’s ratification. The author contends that the document’s framework automatically bestows citizenship upon those born on American soil, thereby insulating them from state-level attempts to enforce hereditary slavery.

The People

The book focuses less on individual characters and more on the interplay between legal entities and concepts. The People of the United States act as the primary, though collective, agents who, in the author's view, established a government meant for universal protection. He contrasts their role with that of The Framers, whose private intentions he largely dismisses as secondary to the actual text of the Constitution. He argues that the people were bound by the words they enacted, not by the subjective hopes of the convention members. Lord Mansfield serves as a vital legal authority, whose historical rulings on the "odious" nature of slavery provide the standard for the author’s own rigorous legal testing. Finally, The Judiciary is presented as a body with a moral and professional obligation to favor interpretations that uphold liberty over those that sanction injustice. These figures are not protagonists in a drama, but rather the participants in a grand debate over the legitimacy of the American experiment.

In Its Own Voice

"That law, I mean, which, and which only, judicial tribunals are morally bound, under all circumstances, to declare and sustain?"

The author asks this to differentiate true justice from arbitrary power.

"The dividing line between the equal liberties of each must never be transgressed by either."

He offers this as the primary principle defining the limits of individual liberty.

"There is no legal difference between being 'bound to service,' and being 'held to service or labor.'"

This is used to argue that the Constitution does not recognize slaves, but merely specific categories of service.

What It's Really About

The central theme is the supremacy of natural law as the only valid basis for a constitutional government. The work probes the question of whether a written constitution can be interpreted to permit the destruction of the very rights it was created to secure. By challenging the reader to view the Constitution as a document of universal liberty, the author explores the tension between legal formalism and systemic injustice. The inquiry beneath the text is whether "law" is simply whatever power dictates, or if it must possess an internal, moral consistency. It is an argument about the power of language to restrict or enable tyranny.

Why Read It Today

Readers interested in the history of American legal thought, abolitionist rhetoric, or the philosophy of constitutional interpretation will find this work compelling. It is a dense, academic argument that rewards careful attention to its logical structure. For a modern reader, the text offers a unique window into the mid-19th-century effort to use the legal system to challenge an entrenched moral evil. While the prose is formal and relies on the legal vernacular of the 1840s, the underlying passion for human rights remains striking. The book does not attempt to be a neutral historical account; it is a forceful, partisan legal brief. Those who appreciate rigorous, systematic reasoning will find the author’s commitment to his axioms impressive, even if his conclusions were controversial in his own time. It is a challenging read that demands the reader navigate complex legal definitions, but it ultimately leaves one reflecting on the relationship between written law and the enduring ideals of a free society.